The spaceport dilemma for Starship

On April 20, 2023, SpaceX performed the first orbital test flight of Starship, the largest rocket ever built, from its spaceport Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas (1). The unmanned flight ended four minutes after takeoff when the vehicle began to plummet and was destroyed. Residents and researchers are trying to assess the impact of the blast on local communities, their health, habitat and wildlife, including endangered species. The large amount of sand- and ash-like particulate matter and heavier debris kicked up by the launch is of primary concern. The particulate emissions have spread far beyond the expected debris field. Images captured during the test flight show that SpaceX's launch pad exploded, with chunks of concrete flying in multiple directions, leaving behind this giant crater. Massive concrete debris ended up in the ocean, and some pieces risked hitting fuel storage tanks, aka the silos adjacent to the launch pad. Following the explosion, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halted the launch program of the company's Starship Super Heavy, pending the results of an investigation into the accident. No injuries or damage to public property had yet been reported to the government agency(2). This test was a success. SpaceX's Starship spacecraft atop Super Heavy first stage booster is the tallest and most powerful rocket ever flown, with twice the thrust of the American-developed Saturn V launch vehicle in the 1960s, and even more powerful than the N1 /L3 conceived by the Soviets in the same period, whose first stage was the most powerful stage of a rocket ever flown for over 50 years, generating 45.4 MN of thrust. By comparison, SpaceX's Starship generated 75.9 MN thrust. Curiously, each of the four attempts to launch an N1 failed, with the second attempt resulting in the vehicle crashing onto the launch pad shortly after liftoff. Considering how SpaceX is just watching a hole in its launch pad and not the entire destruction of its spaceport helps put into perspective the engineering difficulty of launching an integrated rocket of that size, and the success of having lifted off and flown a vehicle that reached an altitude that in fifty years no one had ever tried to pass or even reach. The Starship spacecraft was to make nearly one orbit around the Earth before reentering the atmosphere and making a targeted splashdown in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. The Super Heavy Booster was scheduled to perform a controlled landing on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico approximately 20 miles (30 km) off the Texas coast 8 minutes after liftoff. The rocket took off at 08:33 CDT (13:33 UTC) from the Boca Chica spaceport, causing unexpected damage to the launch pad and surrounding infrastructure. Multiple engines failed during and after takeoff. The vehicle passed the point of maximum dynamic pressure (max q) and entered supersonic flight, but the spacecraft failed to separate from the booster. The built-in Starship then climbed to a maximum altitude of 39 km (24 miles) before problems with as many as eight of the rocket's 33 Raptor 2 engines caused it to capsize. The spacecraft then crashed until the Autonomous Flight Termination System destroyed the vehicle nearly 4 minutes into flight. It's unrealistic that SpaceX could return to test the launcher it promises to take humans to the moon and Mars in the next couple of months. Philippe Battiste, president of CNES (in French, Centre national d'études spatiales), head of the Guyanese Space Centre, which is the main European launch centre, underlined how the images of the damage caused to the Boca Chica base are a warning of how a launch is a risky event in which all parameters, including the safety of goods and people and the environmental impact, are fundamental. At the Guyanese Space Centre, the Europeans make every effort to reduce risk right from the design of launch sets (3). For example, it was decided to create combustion gas evacuation ducts and jet deflectors, whose role is to convey the gases coming from the engines away from the launcher and the installations. For ELA-4, the launch complex of the future Ariane 6, the shipyard as a whole met stringent criteria in terms of safety and environmental impact. At each launch, more than 600 environmental parameters are analysed from Kourou to Sinnamary, reiterating how CNES has been studying the impact of activities on the environment with its partners for nearly 30 years. The president of CNES is right because legislation places enormous importance on the environment, people and property (4). A fair and adequate attention to a technology that is, however, obsolete if compared to that available to the Americans. Indeed, Europe must regain competitiveness in the launcher market, which, at the time of writing this article, does not exist (5). It is enough to recall the failure of the VEGA-C new medium-sized European rocket produced by the Italian AVIO in its second flight. The rocket's second stage, a solid motor called the Zephyr-40, malfunctioned minutes after liftoff (6). We're not even talking about second-stage reusability or even a privately run spaceport. The comment by the president of CNES does not add much to the challenge that the American company has set itself, namely that of helping humanity to be a multi-planetary species, and this provides for the reusability of the spacecraft, its reliability and, last but not least, its environmental and economic sustainability. The Starbase spaceport and the Guyana Space Center respond to two very different approaches. The Guyana Space Centre is a centre equipped to launch primarily astronauts and goods and it is governed by the president of CNES. The site is heavily regulated by the French Republic and the European Union in an industry such as space which is heavily influenced by European government space agencies in ESA and public funding of missions. Starbase instead follows a more commercial approach. As a private spaceport, it is subject to specific regulations and permits from various government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT). The FAA is responsible for issuing launch licenses and permits for space launches and re-entries. SpaceX has obtained several licenses from the FAA to conduct launches and test flights from the Boca Chica spaceport. These licenses and permits are issued on a case-by-case basis and include specific conditions and requirements that SpaceX must follow to ensure the safety of the public and the environment. The USCG is responsible for maintaining maritime security around the launch site and works closely with SpaceX to establish safety zones and coordinate launch activities. The TxDOT is responsible for managing the roads and infrastructure around the launch site and works with SpaceX to ensure that roads and facilities are maintained and upgraded as needed. In addition to these regulatory agencies, SpaceX also works closely with local and state authorities to ensure they comply with all applicable laws and regulations. This includes obtaining permits for environmental impact assessments, land use and other regulatory requirements. Overall, the legislation and regulations for the Boca Chica Spaceport are complex and multifaceted, involving multiple government agencies and stakeholders. SpaceX must comply with all of these regulations to ensure the safe and successful operation of the spaceport. A spaceport must be designed for more than just putting satellites into orbit. Therefore, Starbase must be capable of hosting a spacecraft that embodies these ambitions, which can only be achieved through trial and error. Still, it is necessary to consider future passengers and safety standards to protect people, propellants and the entire structure. Unlike other launch sites for large rockets, Starbase lacks a water deluge system to suppress shock waves and a flame trench, designed to deflect plume exhaust away from the pad during liftoff. The lack of these structural elements had already raised doubts for Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, in 2020. At the time, Musk believed it could be a mistake. A few days before the launch, Musk himself revealed that SpaceX had, in fact, already started building a huge, water-cooled steel plate to put under the launch pad three months ago. The plate, however, wasn't ready in time for the Starship's debut, and SpaceX went ahead anyway, figuring that the structure's concrete made of fondag (a material extremely resistant to high temperatures) could survive a liftoff. Well, that wasn't the case. Starship hasn't achieved its goal of mastering the ascent of a spaceflight, but assuming its engineers accomplish that goal on their next attempt, they’ll still have to work out the other part of its revolutionary approach: getting all the parts of the spacecraft to land safely so they can be reused. The FAA crash investigation is standard practice when rockets go off. The FAA investigation must conclude that Starship does not jeopardise public safety before it can be launched again. As the debris spread far more than expected (7), the FAA's Anomaly Response Plan also went into effect, meaning SpaceX must complete additional environmental mitigations before re-applying for its launch license.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1) SpaceX Starship Super Heavy Project at the Boca Chica Launch Site
https://www.faa.gov/space/stakeholder_engagement/spacex_starship

2) FAA, NEWSROOM, STATEMENTS, APRIL 20. 2023
Space Operations / SpaceX Starship Super Heavy / Boca Chica, Texas 
https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements

3 ) Philippe Baptiste’s comment on LinkedIN
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/philippe-baptiste-0bb0b76_le-lancement-de-starship-par-spacex-et-les-activity-7056998603466133504-AKuB?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

4) Loi no 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000018931380

5) Europe’s independent access to space is at risk, says space agency chief
https://www.ft.com/content/14b060df-4cfc-4494-a3d2-2af57dc6fa2a

6) AVIO, PERDITA MISSIONE VV22
https://www.avio.com/it/comunicati-stampa/volo-vv22-interruzione-prematura-della-missione

7) FAA, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (PEA), EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-06/Final_PEA_Executive_Summary.pdf